

Review

Hidden dissatisfaction after agreement: Post-negotiation perceptual alignment

Alexandra Mislin

Negotiations continue to have consequences after an agreement or impasse. When parties reach a deal, value is often created only later, as they implement commitments, adapt to uncertainty, or decide whether to negotiate again. This review introduces post-negotiation perceptual alignment, how accurately a negotiator understands the counterpart's post-negotiation experience. Integrating research on subjective value, interpersonal perception, and post-agreement outcomes, I distinguish four states: recognized satisfaction, recognized dissatisfaction, overestimated dissatisfaction, and hidden dissatisfaction. Hidden dissatisfaction is consequential because it creates a false sense of success where one party treats agreement as evidence that the negotiation went well while the counterpart carries forward negative appraisals that remain unrecognized and unaddressed. Recent research suggests tactics that appear successful at agreement can impose unrecognized social and relational costs. I review why misalignment arises, emphasizing how negotiators' imperfect inferences about counterparts' experiences can combine with social pressures that discourage dissatisfied parties from speaking up. I conclude by outlining directions for measuring alignment and testing how negotiators can recognize and respond to dissatisfaction after negotiations.

Addresses

Kogod School of Business, American University, Washington, DC, USA

Corresponding author: Mislin, Alexandra (mislin@american.edu)

Negotiation research has long focused on treating negotiations as discrete exchanges that end in agreement, with deal terms serving as the primary outcome. Yet an agreement often marks the beginning rather than the end of a negotiation's economic and relational consequences. Accordingly, a recent review identifies post-negotiation

behavior as a distinct and understudied phase [1], while contemporary accounts characterize negotiation as a complex social interaction embedded in contexts, relationships, and past exchanges [2]. This broader view is important when agreements require implementation, discretionary effort, trust, repeated exchange, or adaptation to uncertain future conditions [3–7]. In these settings, a deal can appear successful even when one party remains dissatisfied, and the other fails to recognize it. This hidden dissatisfaction may undermine implementation and erode the agreement's longer-term value.

Post-negotiation perceptual alignment describes how accurately one negotiator understands the counterpart's experience after a negotiation. Put simply, it asks whether each party accurately understands how the other feels about the negotiation process and its outcome. For example, a client may sign a service agreement while feeling dissatisfied with the process, even as the provider interprets the signature as evidence that the client is satisfied. This is hidden dissatisfaction. The construct applies after either agreement or impasse, although its consequences may be especially important after agreement when parties must implement commitments. The construct builds on subjective value research, which shows that negotiators evaluate outcomes by deal terms as well as process, self, and relationship value [8–10], and meta-perception research, which distinguishes people's beliefs about how others see them from how others actually see them [11,12].

Alignment matters because agreement on deal terms does not mean that negotiators share the same understanding of what happened. A negotiator may be satisfied with the negotiated agreement while feeling alienated by the process or doubtful about the relationship. Subjective value research provides tools for measuring these perceptions [8], but perceptual alignment is about whether negotiators accurately understand each other's experiences. Hidden dissatisfaction can therefore leave one party believing the agreement is secure while the other privately withdraws support, reducing cooperation, and jeopardizing implementation and the long-term value of the agreement.

Alignment can vary across post-negotiation dimensions. For example, a counterpart may feel fairly treated but disappointed by the outcome or economically satisfied

Current Opinion in Psychology 2027, **73**:102413

This review comes from a themed issue on VSI: Current Directions and New Horizons in Negotiation Research

Edited by Maurice Schweitzer, Brian Gunia and Nazli M. Bhatia

For complete overview about the section, refer [Current Directions and New Horizons in Negotiation Research](#)

Available online 27 August 2026

<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2026.102413>

2352-250X/© 2026 Elsevier Ltd. All rights are reserved, including those for text and data mining, AI training, and similar technologies.

but relationally alienated. A negotiator may also be accurate about one dimension and inaccurate about another. This matters theoretically because different dimensions may lead to different post-agreement problems. Misreading instrumental dissatisfaction could lead to disputes over implementation, while misreading process dissatisfaction may lead to avoidance of future negotiation. The framework therefore complements subjective value by considering whether the negotiation experience of each party is mutually understood. I argue that negotiators are better positioned to manage post-agreement consequences when they know whether the counterpart is generally satisfied or dissatisfied because this recognition can guide negotiators toward more effective post-negotiation behavior.

Related literature has explored concepts adjacent to dyadic alignment. Interactional justice congruence research shows that dyads can benefit when both parties similarly perceive whether they treated one another with respect and honesty, especially face to face [13]. Research on conflict asymmetry and conflict accuracy shows that people embedded in the same social episode can disagree about whether conflict exists and how intense it is [14,15]. Organizational justice and procedural fairness research similarly show that reactions depend not only on distributive outcomes, but on respectful, truthful, and fair treatment [16,17]. Post-negotiation perceptual alignment brings these insights into a post-negotiation context. Table 1 summarizes four post-negotiation states.

Four post-negotiation states

Recognized satisfaction occurs when the counterpart leaves satisfied and the focal negotiator accurately recognizes this satisfaction. This state supports post-negotiation cooperation because the counterpart's experience and the focal negotiator's belief are consistent. Evidence on implementation, communication, and trust shows that relational signals before and during contracting can influence later willingness to follow through with agreements [3,4,18]. Recognized satisfaction gives parties a stable starting point for implementation and future exchange.

Recognized dissatisfaction occurs when the counterpart leaves dissatisfied and the focal negotiator recognizes it. This visible dissatisfaction can be uncomfortable and may compel the focal negotiator to ask questions, try to clarify tradeoffs, or attempt to repair relations. Trust repair research shows that repair depends not only on whether parties offer words or deeds, but also on whether their responses signal responsibility, shared values, and respect for the person harmed [19]. Research comparing forced and voluntary apologies further suggests that repair is more effective when apologies appear voluntary and value-consistent rather than demanded [20]. Specific explanations after rejection can also preserve people's willingness to speak up again [21]. Recognition can therefore convert dissatisfaction from a latent threat into a problem that parties can address.

Overestimated dissatisfaction occurs when the counterpart is satisfied but the focal negotiator believes the counterpart is dissatisfied. This false alarm can lead to unnecessary avoidance, inaccurate learning, and excessive relational caution. Job-offer negotiators, for example, overestimate the likelihood that negotiating will cause the offer to be withdrawn [22]. Research on the liking gap offers adjacent evidence; after conversations, people have been found to systematically underestimate how much their partners like them [23]. More broadly, many people choose not to negotiate even when negotiation could benefit them [24]. Negotiators often perceive social and psychological costs to engaging in negotiations even when there are economic consequences to avoiding [25]. Overestimated dissatisfaction may therefore suppress future negotiation even when an interaction feels acceptable to the counterpart.

Hidden dissatisfaction occurs when the counterpart leaves dissatisfied but the focal negotiator believes the counterpart is satisfied. This state is especially consequential after agreement because it creates a false sense of success. The focal negotiator may leave the interaction believing things went well, while the counterpart carries forward unspoken negative appraisals that go unrecognized and unrepaired. Several recent lines of work shed light on this dynamic. Ambitious first offers improve

Table 1

Post-negotiation perceptual alignment states.

	Counterpart leaves satisfied	Counterpart leaves dissatisfied
Focal negotiator believes counterpart left satisfied	Recognized satisfaction	Hidden dissatisfaction
Focal negotiator believes counterpart left dissatisfied	Overestimated dissatisfaction	Recognized dissatisfaction

negotiator value when agreement occurs but also increase impasse and reduce recipients' subjective value [26]. Emotional misrepresentation and anger tactics can generate short-term concessions while creating blow-back, guilt, low felt trust, or weaker implementation [27,28]. Related work distinguishes exaggerating or fabricating emotion from suppressing genuinely felt emotion and finds that suppression is judged as less harmful and more ethical than exaggeration or fabrication [29]. This asymmetry may help explain how dissatisfaction remains concealed and why counterparts may mistake emotional restraint for satisfaction. Negotiation can also increase perceived relational conflict and thereby reduce post-agreement effort and performance [30], showing that comparable deal terms can produce different implementation value depending on how the agreement was reached. Although these studies do not directly measure hidden dissatisfaction, they show how negotiation processes and tactics can generate social and subjective-value costs that remain unrecognized at agreement but matter after the deal [31].

Why misalignment happens

One source of misalignment is inaccurate perception of the counterpart. Negotiators often assume a fixed pie between their own and the counterpart's interests and can misread situationally induced bargaining behavior as stable personality [32]. The prevalence of win-lose frames in real-world conflict reinforces the idea that negotiators may enter and leave negotiations with overly competitive schemas for interpreting others [33]. Perspective taking can improve discovery of hidden agreements and integrative outcomes [34]. Psychological contract research suggests perceptual incongruence is especially likely when obligations are complex or ambiguous, parties bring different interpretive schemas to the exchange, and communication is insufficient to establish a shared understanding [35,36]. Individual differences and dyadic fit may also matter [37]. The ability to recognize emotions, a component of emotional intelligence, predicts negotiation outcomes and perceived cooperativeness [38], making it a plausible antecedent of alignment. Power is another candidate, as high-power individuals take others' perspectives less and are less accurate in reading emotion [39]. Virtual channels may compound these problems by reducing cues that help parties interpret counterpart perceptions [13].

Misalignment can also arise because dissatisfaction is not expressed. Negotiation can involve face threats, impression management, politeness concerns, and fear of offending the counterpart [40,41]. The act of reaching agreement itself can carry psychological value, and people sometimes accept poor agreements in part because agreement feels better than impasse [42]. In hierarchical or repeat-exchange settings, low-power

dissatisfied parties may also remain silent because voice can feel unsafe or futile [43]. These pressures can make agreement look like satisfaction and block opportunities for repair.

Changes in alignment and boundary conditions

The value of alignment should vary by context. It should matter most when a counterpart's post-negotiation effort or cooperation affects the total value of the negotiated agreement, as in employment, service, partnership, supply agreements, and other contexts with high economic relevance of relational outcomes [44]. More broadly, negotiations embedded in ongoing relationships are dyadic processes in which relational orientations influence the accumulation of economic and relational capital [37,45]. Alignment should also matter when agreements contain ambiguous obligations, informal promises, psychological contracts, idiosyncratic terms, or ongoing labor relations [35,36,46,47]. Misalignment can even harm parties with formal power, by eroding post-agreement value long after terms are settled, in situations where implementation depends on a lower-power party's effort and cooperation [43,44]. After impasse, alignment may affect whether parties reengage and what they learn, but it should matter less when there is no future interaction.

Post-negotiation perceptual alignment is dynamic. Hidden dissatisfaction may become recognized dissatisfaction when a party voices concerns, withholds cooperation, or resists implementation. Recognized dissatisfaction may shift toward recognized satisfaction when repair efforts clarify misunderstandings and repair trust. Overestimated dissatisfaction may also be corrected when new information reveals the counterpart is more satisfied than initially believed. Conversely, recognized satisfaction may deteriorate into recognized or hidden dissatisfaction if parties later discover unfavorable information about the agreement, the process, or the counterpart's conduct [48,49]. Alignment can therefore change form after agreement or impasse, during implementation, or in future interaction.

Future research

Future research should measure post-negotiation perceptual alignment directly. One approach is to assess each negotiator's subjective value and ask counterparts to estimate one another's experiences. This design would identify awareness gaps, including overestimated counterpart satisfaction and unrecognized dissatisfaction [11,12]. Researchers could then test whether alignment predicts implementation challenges, trust erosion, and future cooperation beyond the effects of subjective value, and whether perspective taking, ability to recognize emotions, power, or negotiation experience predicts alignment [34,38,39]. Designs

comparing agreements and impasses, as well as multi-stage and group designs, may be especially valuable because perceptions may evolve as parties observe subsequent behavior and outcomes [50].

Future research should also identify behavioral cues that reveal or conceal dissatisfaction. New process methods make this increasingly feasible. NegotiAct offers a comprehensive coding scheme for temporal interaction patterns [51], while behavioral-dynamics research shows how apologies, procedural suggestions, and other verbal behaviors become embedded in agreement and non-agreement processes [52]. Active listening often follows multi-issue offers and can support integrative sequences, although it may not automatically increase understanding or rapport [53]. Together, these approaches can test whether specific behaviors help negotiators accurately recognize counterpart satisfaction or dissatisfaction.

Finally, interventions designed to improve alignment should be evaluated. For example, post-negotiation check-ins, debriefs, or meetings at implementation may help surface concerns that would otherwise remain hidden. For interventions to be effective, negotiators may need to understand how their counterparts experienced the negotiation and respond to concerns as they arise.

Conclusion

Negotiations do not end when parties reach agreement or impasse. They move parties into a post-negotiation period where perceptions continue to influence implementation, relationships, and future interaction. This review introduces post-negotiation perceptual alignment, shifting attention from negotiators' individual evaluations to whether those evaluations are accurately understood by their counterparts. Hidden dissatisfaction may matter most after agreement because it creates the appearance of success while limiting opportunities for repair. Studying perceptual alignment connects negotiation processes with their longer-term consequences and helps explain why some agreements endure while others fail.

Credit author statement

Alexandra Mislin: Conceptualization, Investigation, Methodology, Project administration, Visualization, Writing original draft, Writing review & editing.

Declaration of generative AI and AI-assisted technologies in the manuscript preparation process

During the preparation of this work, the author used ChatGPT (OpenAI) for editorial feedback and language refinement. The author reviewed and edited the output

as needed and takes full responsibility for the content of the published article.

Declaration of competing interest

The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

Data availability

No data was used for the research described in the article.

References

References of particular interest have been highlighted as:

* of special interest

** of outstanding interest

- Schweitzer ME, Krueger KL, Boothby E, Cooney G: **Negotiation**. In *The handbook of social psychology*. Edited by Gilbert DT, Fiske ST, Finkel EJ, Mendes WB. 6th ed., Situational Press; 2025, <https://doi.org/10.70400/NUZE7621>.
- Boothby EJ, Cooney G, Schweitzer ME: **Embracing complexity: a review of negotiation research**. *Annu Rev Psychol* 2023, **74**: 299–332, <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-033020-014116>.
- Bottom WP, Holloway J, Miller GJ, Mislin A, Whitford A: **Building a pathway to cooperation: negotiation and social exchange between principal and agent**. *Adm Sci Q* 2006, **51**:29–58, <https://doi.org/10.2189/asqu.51.1.29>.
- Mislin AA, Campagna RL, Bottom WP: **After the deal: talk, trust building and the implementation of negotiated agreements**. *Organ Behav Hum Decis Process* 2011, **115**:55–68, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2011.01.002>.
- Jang D, Elfenbein HA, Bottom WP: **More than a phase: form and features of a general theory of negotiation**. *Acad Manag Ann* 2018, **12**:318–356, <https://doi.org/10.5465/annals.2016.0053>.
- Heydenbluth C, Aaldering H, Zhang H, Majer JM, Trötschel R: **How do negotiators resolve conflict over resources of changing value: the role of trust in sequential negotiations**. *J Exp Psychol Appl* 2026, **32**:173–191, <https://doi.org/10.1037/xap0000555>.
- Schauer M, Majer JM, Heydenbluth C, Trötschel R: **Playing it safe: negotiators avoid uncertainty and reach safer, but less integrative agreements**. *J Exp Soc Psychol* 2026, **125**, 104924, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2026.104924>.
- Curhan JR, Elfenbein HA, Xu H: **What do people value when they negotiate? Mapping the domain of subjective value in negotiation**. *J Pers Soc Psychol* 2006, **91**:493–512, <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.91.3.493>.
- Curhan JR, Elfenbein HA, Kilduff GJ: **Getting off on the right foot: subjective value versus economic value in predicting longitudinal job outcomes from job offer negotiations**. *J Appl Psychol* 2009, **94**:524–534, <https://doi.org/10.1037/a0013746>.
- Curhan JR, Elfenbein HA, Eisenkraft N: **The objective value of subjective value: a multi-round negotiation study**. *J Appl Soc Psychol* 2010, **40**:690–709, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1559-1816.2010.00593.x>.
- Donnelly K, Moon A, Critcher CR: **Do people know how others view them? Two approaches for identifying the accuracy of metaperceptions**. *Curr Opin Psychol* 2022, **43**:119–124, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2021.06.018>.
- Vorauer JD, Hodges SD, Hall JA: **Thought-feeling accuracy in person perception and metaperception: an integrative**

- perspective.** *Annu Rev Psychol* 2025, **76**:413–441, <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-011624-024416>.
13. Kleshinski CE, Schwind Wilson K, Derue DS, Conlon DE: **Does justice need to be in the eyes of both beholders? Examining face-to-face and virtual negotiators' interactional justice congruence.** *Negot Confl Manag Res* 2023, **16**:100–131, <https://doi.org/10.34891/2022.555>.
 14. Avgar AC, Neuman EJ: **Seeing conflict: a study of conflict accuracy in work teams.** *Negot Confl Manag Res* 2015, **8**: 65–84, <https://doi.org/10.1111/ncmr.12048>.
 15. Jehn KA, Rispens S, Thatcher SMB: **The effects of conflict asymmetry on work group and individual outcomes.** *Acad Manag J* 2010, **53**:596–616, <https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2010.51468978>.
 16. Colquitt JA, Wesson MJ, Porter COLH, Conlon DE, Ng KY: **Justice at the millennium: a meta-analytic review of 25 years of organizational justice research.** *J Appl Psychol* 2001, **86**: 425–445, <https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.86.3.425>.
 17. Hollander-Blumoff R, Tyler TR: **Procedural justice in negotiation: procedural fairness, outcome acceptance, and integrative potential.** *Law Soc Inq* 2008, **33**:473–500, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-4469.2008.00110.x>.
 18. Kong DT, Dirks KT, Ferrin DL: **Interpersonal trust within negotiations: meta-analytic evidence, critical contingencies, and directions for future research.** *Acad Manag J* 2014, **57**: 1235–1255, <https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2012.0461>.
 19. Druckman D, Lewicki RJ, Doyle SP: **Repairing violations of trustworthiness in negotiation.** *J Appl Soc Psychol* 2019, **49**: 145–158, <https://doi.org/10.1111/jasp.12571>.
 20. Langlinais LA, Tomlinson EC: **Forced versus voluntary apologies: trust repair as a matter of perceived values.** *Negot Confl Manag Res* 2025, **19**:30–45, <https://doi.org/10.34891/0kq7-ec36>.
 21. Qian S, Hamstra MRW, Jawahar IM, Schreurs B, Guzman FA: **Disagreeing with Employees' Constructive Disagreement: on Giving (Non-)Specific Explanations for Rejecting Employees' voiced suggestions.** *Negot Confl Manag Res* 2025, **18**:97–116, <https://doi.org/10.34891/hzq2-h577>.
 22. Hart E, Bear JB, Ren Z (Bella): **But what if I lose the offer? Negotiators' inflated perception of their likelihood of jeopardizing a deal.** *Organ Behav Hum Decis Process* 2024, **181**, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2024.104319>.
 23. Boothby EJ, Cooney G, Sandstrom GM, Clark MS: **The liking gap in conversations: do people like us more than we think?** *Psychol Sci* 2018, **29**:1742–1756, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797618783714>.
 24. Small DA, Gelfand M, Babcock L, Gettman H: **Who goes to the bargaining table? The influence of gender and framing on the initiation of negotiation.** *J Pers Soc Psychol* 2007, **93**: 600–613, <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.93.4.600>.
 25. Hunsaker DA, Zhang H, Lee AJ: **Beyond propensity: Thresholds, costs, and interventions in negotiation avoidance.** *Negot Confl Manag Res* 2025, **18**:37–56, <https://doi.org/10.34891/yv27-1416>.
 26. Petrowsky HM, Boecker L, Escher YA, Frech ML, Friese M, Galinsky AD, et al.: **The power and peril of first offers in negotiations: a conceptual, meta-analytic, and experimental synthesis.** *Organ Behav Hum Decis Process* 2025, **191**, 104448, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2025.104448>.
 27. Campagna RL, Mislin AA, Kong DT, Bottom WP: **Strategic consequences of emotional misrepresentation in negotiation: the blowback effect.** *J Appl Psychol* 2016, **101**:605–624, <https://doi.org/10.1037/apl0000072>.
 28. Campagna RL, Mislin AA, Bottom WP: **Motivated by guilt and low felt trust: the impact of negotiators' anger expressions on the implementation of negotiated agreements.** *J Behav Decis Making* 2019, **32**:450–470, <https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.2119>.
 29. Kang P, Schweitzer ME: **Emotional deception in negotiation.** *Organ Behav Hum Decis Process* 2022, **173**, 104193, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2022.104193>.
 30. Hart E, Schweitzer ME: **Getting to less: when negotiating harms post-agreement performance.** *Organ Behav Hum Decis Process* 2020, **156**:155–175, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2019.09.005>.
 31. Sharma S, Elfenbein HA, Sinha R, Bottom WP: **The effects of emotional expressions in negotiation: a meta-analysis and future directions for research.** *Hum Perform* 2020, **33**: 331–353, <https://doi.org/10.1080/08959285.2020.1783667>.
 32. Thompson L, Hastie R: **Social perception in negotiation.** *Organ Behav Hum Decis Process* 1990, **47**:98–123.
 33. Majer JM, Engler JO, Saxena E, Mojzisch A: **Conflict frames in the wild: win-lose frames are more common, but mixed and win-win frames are more effective.** *J Econ Psychol* 2026, **112**, 102868, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2025.102868>.
 34. Galinsky AD, Maddux WW, Gilin D, White JB: **Why it pays to get inside the head of your opponent: the differential effects of perspective taking and empathy in negotiations.** *Psychol Sci* 2008, **19**:378–384, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02096.x>.
 35. Morrison EW, Robinson SL: **When employees feel betrayed: a model of how psychological contract violation develops.** *Acad Manag Rev* 1997, **22**:226–256, <https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.1997.9707180265>.
 36. Rousseau DM: **Schema, promise and mutuality: the building blocks of the psychological contract.** *J Occup Organ Psychol* 2001, **74**:511–541, <https://doi.org/10.1348/096317901167505>.
 37. Elfenbein HA: **Individual differences in negotiation: a relational process model.** *Org Psychol Rev* 2021, **11**:73–93, <https://doi.org/10.1177/2041386620962551>.
 38. Schlegel K, Mehu M, van Peer JM, Scherer KR: **Sense and sensibility: the role of cognitive and emotional intelligence in negotiation.** *J Res Pers* 2018, **74**:6–15, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2017.12.003>.
 39. Galinsky AD, Magee JC, Inesi ME, Gruenfeld DH: **Power and perspectives not taken.** *Psychol Sci* 2006, **17**:1068–1074, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01824.x>.
 40. Lee AJ, Mason MF, Malcomb CS: **Beyond cheap talk accounts: a theory of politeness in negotiations.** *Res Organ Behav* 2021, **41**, 100154, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.riob.2021.100154>.
 41. Tuncel E, Kong DT, McLean Parks J, van Kleef GA: **Face threat sensitivity in distributive negotiations: effects on negotiator self-esteem and demands.** *Organ Behav Hum Decis Process* 2020, **161**:255–273, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2020.07.004>.
 42. Tuncel E, Mislin A, Kesebir S, Pinkley RL: **Agreement attraction and impasse aversion: reasons for selecting a poor deal over No deal at all.** *Psychol Sci* 2016, **27**:312–321, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797615619200>.
 43. Morrison EW: **Employee voice and silence: taking stock a decade later.** *Ann Rev Organ Psychol Organ Behav* 2023, **10**: 79–107, <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-orgpsych-120920-054654>.
 44. Hart E, Schweitzer ME: **When we should care more about relationships than favorable deal terms in negotiation: the economic relevance of relational outcomes (ERRO).** *Organ Behav Hum Decis Process* 2022, **168**, 104108, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2021.104108>.
 45. Gelfand MJ, Major VS, Raver JL, Nishii LH, O'Brien K: **Negotiating relationally: the dynamics of the relational self in negotiations.** *Acad Manag Rev* 2006, **31**:427–451, <https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.2006.20208689>.
 46. Rousseau DM, Ho VT, Greenberg J: **I-Deals: idiosyncratic terms in employment relationships.** *Acad Manag Rev* 2006, **31**:977–994, <https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.2006.22527470>.

47. Walton RE, McKersie RB. In *A behavioral theory of labor negotiations: an analysis of a social interaction system*. 2nd ed. Ithica, NY: IRL Press; 1991.
48. Boles TL, Croson RTA, Murnighan JK: **Deception and retribution in repeated ultimatum bargaining**. *Organ Behav Hum Decis Process* 2000, **83**:235–259, <https://doi.org/10.1006/obhd.2000.2908>.
49. Tinsley CH, O'Connor KM, Sullivan BA: **Tough guys finish last: the perils of a distributive reputation**. *Organ Behav Hum Decis Process* 2002, **88**:621–642.
50. Yan S, Guo W, Lu W, Wang Y: **Understanding the cross-level effects of subjective value and negotiation behavior on negotiator satisfaction**. *Negot Confl Manag Res* 2025, **18**: 278–305, <https://doi.org/10.34891/agpw-ez32>.
51. Jäckel E, Zerres A, Hemshorn de Sanchez CS, Lehmann-Willenbrock N, Hüffmeier J: **NegotiAct: introducing a comprehensive coding scheme to capture temporal interaction patterns in negotiations**. *Group Organ Manag* 2024, **49**:743–783, <https://doi.org/10.1177/10596011221132600>.
52. Engel J, Teichert-Kluge J, Hemshorn De Sánchez CS, Lehmann-Willenbrock N: **Behavioral dynamics in negotiations: how specific verbal behaviors relate to negotiation agreements and negotiation processes**. *Negot Confl Manag Res* 2026, **19**: 1–35, <https://doi.org/10.34891/t324-yj24>.
53. Jäckel E, Zerres A, Hüffmeier J: **Active listening in integrative negotiation**. *Commun Res* 2025, **52**:946–975, <https://doi.org/10.1177/00936502241230711>.
12. * This integrative review organizes evidence on how accurately people judge others' thoughts and feelings, including others' views of the self. It identifies systematic metaperceptual biases as a source of preventable thought-feeling inaccuracy, providing a foundation for studying whether negotiators recognize counterparts' post-negotiation experiences.
20. * In a workplace trust-violation study, voluntary apologies produced higher trust than apologies demanded by the trustor, and this difference was mediated by overlapping mental representations of key values. The article shows that the context and perceived motivation behind a repair attempt can matter as much as the apology itself.
21. * Across two experiments with American and Chinese participants, specific explanations for rejecting voiced suggestions increased employees' voice safety and willingness to speak up again. It identifies a communication behavior that can keep dissatisfaction visible after disagreement.
25. ** Across five studies with 5881 participants, the authors show that negotiation avoidance is common. They quantify thresholds for initiating negotiation and estimate willingness to pay to avoid negotiating. The article treats avoidance as a measurable consequence of perceived economic and psychological costs.
26. ** This preregistered meta-analysis and experimental synthesis shows that ambitious first offers improve offer-maker value but also increase impasse and reduce recipients' subjective value, with anger helping explain the social costs. It demonstrates how economically successful tactics can impose counterpart-side relational costs.
33. * Using two archival studies of real-world conflicts, this article shows that win-lose frames are more common than win-win frames, but that mixed frames are most effective with counterparts and mixed or win-win frames are most effective with third parties. It links conflict framing to how parties perceive and respond to negotiated conflict.
50. * In a two-stage simulated group negotiation with 228 business professionals, satisfaction depended on subjective value, focal and opponent behavior, and both parties' profits. The article treats negotiator satisfaction as dynamic and cross-level rather than as a static post-deal attitude.
52. * Using 22,880 coded verbal behaviors from 40 professional negotiation-training sessions, this article identifies behaviors associated with agreement and non-agreement, including apologies and procedural suggestions. It shows how fine-grained process coding can reveal interaction cues relevant to post-negotiation alignment.
53. * In 48 videotaped integrative negotiations, active listening followed multi-issue offers and predicted joint value only within that sequence, demonstrating that its benefits depend on context.

Further information on references of particular interest

1. * This comprehensive review conceptualizes negotiation as a complex social interaction and organizes the literature around four key phases, including post-negotiation behavior. It explains how this last phase can create or erode measurable value and identifies it as a major opportunity for future research.
6. * Across three interactive experiments, negotiators prioritized the initial allocation conflict and failed to make efficient trade-offs that accounted for resources' changing value over time. It shows that sequential agreements can leave future value unrealized, and that making trust more consequential does not necessarily solve this inefficiency.
7. * Three interactive studies show outcome uncertainty reduced negotiators' exploration of priority differences and led parties to reach safer, less integrative agreements. It shows how uncertainty, a common feature of post-agreement contexts, can directly undermine value creation.